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Abstract
Congestion games have extensively been studied till recently. An interesting
special class of congestion games on networks is the class of congestion games
on extension-parallel networks considered by Holzman and Law-yone (2003). It
is shown by Fotakis (2010) that for every congestion game on an extension-parallel
network, any best-response sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium of the game
in n steps, where n is the number of players.
We show that the fast convergence of best-response sequences results from M-
convexity (introduced byMurota (1996)) of the potential function associated with the
game. It is revealed that the best-response dynamic process corresponds to a greedy
algorithm for minimizing M-convex functions. We also give a characterization of
M-convex functions in terms of greedy algorithms.
Key words: Congestion game, best-response dynamics, M-convex function, discrete con-
vexity
1. Introduction
Congestion games (or finite potential games) have extensively been studied in the lit-
erature (e.g., [1, 8, 11, 12, 14]). An interesting special class of congestion games on
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networks, which is called congestion games on extension-parallel networks, is consid-
ered by Holzman and Law-yone [12] (see also [6, 14, 19]). Fotakis [8] showed a fast
convergence behavior of the best-response dynamics for such games. That is, for every
congestion game on an extension-parallel network, any best-response sequence converges
to a pure Nash equilibrium of the game in n steps, where n is the number of the players.
However, the underlying structure that brings the fast convergence has not yet fully been
understood.
In the present paper we show that the fast convergence of best-response sequences
results from M-convexity of the potential function associated with the game. M-convex
functions were introduced by Murota [16, 17] based on Dress and Wenzel [4, 5]. The
convex conjugate (or Legendre transform) of an M-convex function is called an L-convex
function [17] (also see [7]). It has been recognized that L-/M-convex functions appear
in various fields of operations research, economics, mathematics, and others (see, e.g.,
[2, 10, 18, 25]). We now find yet another interesting instance of M-convexity structure in
congestion games.
The present paper is organized as follows. We briefly review congestion games in
Section 2 andM-convex functions in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine the best-response
dynamics for congestion games on extension-parallel networks and show that the essence
of the fast convergence of the best-response dynamics is due to the M-convexity structure
of the games. It is revealed in Section 5 that the best-response dynamics corresponds to
a greedy algorithm for minimizing M-convex functions, which is a natural generalization
of the greedy algorithm due to Dress and Wenzel [4] for valuated matroids. We also show
a characterization of M-convex functions in terms of greedy algorithms.
2. Congestion Games
A congestion game [20] is a tuple   = (N;A; (P(i) j i 2 N); (ca j a 2 A)), where
(a) N is a finite nonempty set of players,
(b) A is a set of resources,
(c) for each i 2 N , P(i) is a set of subsets of A, i.e., P(i)  2A,
(d) for each resource a 2 A, ca : Z0 ! R0 is a nondecreasing function satisfying
ca(0) = 0.
Each player i 2 N selects a set Pi 2 P (i), which forms a strategy configuration P = (Pi j
i 2 N). The congestion induced by P at resource a 2 A is
P(a) = jfi 2 N j a 2 Pigj: (2.1)
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Then, the incurred individual cost of player i is given by the sum of congestion costs over





For any player i 2 N and strategy Q 2 P (i) let (P i; Q) be the strategy configuration
obtained from P by replacing Pi by Q.
A potential function associated with a strategy configuration P = (Pi j i 2 N) of the









ca(`) (8a 2 A; 8k 2 Z0): (2.4)
We then have the following fundamental relation
(P i; Q)  (P) = i(P i; Q)  i(P) (2.5)
for any strategy configuration P , i 2 N , and Q 2 P(i). (A game having this property
is called a potential game.) Hence local minima of potential  are exactly pure Nash
equilibria of congestion game  , as shown by Rosenthal [20]. It is shown ([15]) that the
class of congestion games coincides with the class of finite potential games.
3. M-convex Functions
The concept of M-convex function was introduced by Murota ([16, 17]). We briefly re-
view some fundamental properties of M-convex functions.
Let W be a finite nonempty set and f be a function f : ZW ! R [ f+1g. The
effective domain dom(f) of f is defined by dom(f) = fx 2 ZW j f(x) < +1g. The
epigraph epi(f) of f is defined by
epi(f) = f(x; ) j x 2 dom(f); f(x)   2 Rg: (3.1)
We call f convex-extensible if the lower envelope of the convex hull of epi(f) gives a
convex function f : RW ! R [ f+1g such that f(x) = f(x) for all x 2 ZW . The
function f is called the convex extension of f .
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A function f : ZW ! R[f+1g is called anM-convex function if its effective domain
is nonempty and it satisfies the exchange axiom:
(M-EXC) 8x; y 2 ZW , 8u 2 W with x(u) > y(u), 9v 2 W with x(v) < y(v) such that
f(x) + f(y)  f(x  u + v) + f(y + u   v); (3.2)
where u for u 2 W is a unit vector in ZW such that u(u) = 1 and u(v) = 0 for v 6= u,
and we allow +1  +1.
The following is a well-known characterization of M-convex functions (see [16, 17]
and also [9, 23]).
Proposition 1: Let f : ZW ! R[f+1g be a convex-extensible function with a nonempty
bounded effective domain. Let f be the convex extension of f . Then f is an M-convex
function if and only if for every non-vertical edge L of the epigraph epi( f) the direction
vector of the line segment obtained by the projection ((x; ) 7! x onto RW ) of L belongs
to fu   v j u; v 2 W; u 6= vg.
Here any two direction vectors are identified with each other if one is a non-zero scalar
multiple of the other.
The effective domain of any M-convex function f : ZW ! R [ f+1g lies on a
hyperplane x(W )(Pv2W x(v)) = k for some integer k. We call the integer k the rank
of f .
4. Congestion Games on Extension-parallel Networks
Suppose that we are given a directed graph G = (V;A) with a vertex set V , an arc set
A, and specified (distinct) source s and sink t in V . Arc set A is regarded as a set of
resources. Consider a congestion game   = (N;A; (P(i) j i 2 N); (ca j a 2 A)), where
each P(i) is a set of elementary directed paths from source s to sink t (st-paths) in graph
G = (V;A) and every st-path is regarded as a set of the arcs (resources) lying on the path.
An interesting special class of congestion games on networks is the class of congestion
games on extension-parallel networks ([12]). An extension-parallel networkwith a source
and a sink is constructed by finitely many repeated operations of source/sink extension
and parallel join defined below (see Figure 1), starting from finitely many networks, each
consisting of a single arc whose tail and head are, respectively, a source and a sink.
(1) (source extension): Given a network G, construct a new network G0 by adding a
new arc a to a source of G in such a way that the head of a is the source of G and
the tail of a is the source of the new G0.
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(2) (sink extension): Given G, construct a new network G0 by adding a new arc a to a
sink of G in such a way that the tail of a is the sink of G and the head of a is the
sink of the new G0.
(3) (parallel join): Given two distinct networksG1 andG2, construct a new networkG0
by identifying their respective sources as a source of the new G0 and by identifying
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Figure 1: (1) Source extension, (2) Sink extension, and (3) Parallel join.
In the sequel we consider a symmetric game   such that every player’s strategy set
P(i) is the set Pall of all paths from source s to sink t in an extension-parallel network G.
Theorem 2 (Fotakis [8]): For any symmetric congestion game   = (N;A; (P(i)(= Pall) j
i 2 N); (ca j a 2 A)) on an extension-parallel network, any best-response sequence
reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in n(= jN j) steps.
More precisely, Fotakis [8] shows that, for extension-parallel networks, whenever the
strategy of a player i 2 N is its best response with respect to the current state, then even
after some other player changes its strategy to a best response strategy, the strategy of
player i will remain a best response strategy. One way to rephrase Fotakis’ result, is by
stating that the following procedure always leads to a pure Nash equilibrium, no matter
what permutation is chosen in the first step.
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Procedure(Best Response)
1. Start from any strategy configuration P = (Pi j i 2 N).
Let (i1; i2;    ; in) be any permutation of N .
2. For each i = i1; i2;    ; in do the following.
Let P^ 2 Pall be a minimizer of ((P i; P )) in P 2 Pall.
Put P  (P i; P^ ).
3. Return P .
We will now show how the correctness of Procedure(Best Response) can be derived
from results on M-convexity, thus implying Fotakis’ result.
Each strategy configuration P = (Pi j i 2 N) is made to correspond to a vector





where Pi is a unit vector in ZP
all such that Pi(P ) = 1 if P = Pi and = 0 otherwise.
(Note that P is not uniquely determined by xP in general.)
For each arc a 2 A denote by Qa the set of paths P 2 Pall containing arc a. Then we
have the following
Lemma 3: The family of path sets Qa (a 2 A) is laminar, i.e., for any distinct a; a0 2 A
we have Qa \Qa0 = ;, Qa  Qa0 , or Qa  Qa0 .
(Proof) Suppose that during the construction of the extension-parallel graph G = (V;A)
arc a belongs to a graph G1 and arc a0 to another graph G2 and the operation of parallel
join is made for G1 and G2, then there is no st-path that contains both a and a0. Hence
Qa \ Qa0 = ;. On the other hand, if arc a belongs to a graph G1 and arc a0 is used for a
source/sink-extension of G1, then we have Qa  Qa0 . 2
Remark 1: The laminarity structure has been recognized as a rooted tree structure ([11,
13]) such that the set of non-root vertices of the rooted tree is the resource set (arc set)
A of G and the set of non-root vertices of every path in the tree from the root to a leaf
is the arc set of a respective path in G from the source to the sink. The tree structure
described in [11, 13] is closely related to the Tutte decomposition tree of a 2-connected
graph into 3-connected components, cycles, and graphs of parallel arcs (see [26]), where
only the latter two kinds of components appear (even for series-parallel graphs). Here, for
a given extension-parallel (or, more generally, series-parallel) graph G with source s and
sink t, we should define a graph G0 obtained by adding to G a reference arc from s to t
and consider the Tutte decomposition tree of G0. 2
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For a given strategy configuration P = (Pi j i 2 N), using the vector xP 2 ZPall in







c^a(xP(Qa))  ~(xP) (4.2)
regarded as a function, denoted by ~(), in xP , where xP(Qa) =
P
P2Qa xP(P ) for each
a 2 A. Note that ~(xP) is the sum over all a 2 A of scalar, discrete convex functions
c^a() on integers, and the sets Qa (8a 2 A) form a laminar family. It follows that the
function ~(x) in x 2 ZPall is what is called a laminar convex function with its effective
domainn = fx 2 ZPall0 j x(Pall) = ng, where n = jN j. This implies the following (see
[3, 17]).
Lemma 4: The function ~(x) with its effective domain n is an M-convex function.
TheM-convexity of ~ implies the validity of Theorem 2, the n step convergence of the
best-response sequence, due to Fotakis [8]. Procedure(Best Response) can be regarded
as a specialized version of a greedy algorithm for M-convex functions, which will be
discussed in the next section.
5. A Greedy Algorithm for M-Convex Functions
We give a greedy algorithm for M-convex functions, which is a natural generalization of
the greedy algorithm given by Dress and Wenzel [4] for valuated matroids. The greedy
algorithm given in this section is slightly different from the existing algorithms given by
Shioura [21, 22] and Tamura [24] (also see [17]). We show the validity of our greedy
algorithm by adapting Dress and Wenzel’s proof in [4] for valuated matroids.
For a finite nonempty set W let us consider an M-convex function f : ZW ! R [
f+1g having a nonempty bounded effective domain dom(f) = fx 2 ZW j f(x) <
+1g. Suppose that the effective domain is included in the nonnegative orthant, i.e.,
dom(f)  ZW0 and that x(W )(=
P
v2W x(v)) = jN j  1 for all x 2 dom(f), where we
recall that jN j is equal to the rank of f . Also suppose N = f1; 2;    ; ng. It should be
noted thatW corresponds to the setPall of all st-paths and (i) appearing in the algorithm
given below corresponds to player i’s initial strategy Pi 2 Pall.
Greedy Algorithm
1. Start from any x = x0 2 dom(f).
Choose any mapping  : N ! W such that x =Pi2N (i).
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2. For each i = 1; 2;    ; n do the following.
Find an element w ofW such that
(*) f(x  (i) + w) = minff(x  (i) + w) j w 2 Wg.
Put x x  (i) + w .
3. Return x (a minimizer of f ).
Remark 2: We have assumed that the effective domain dom(f) is included in the non-
negative orthant ZW0, but this is equivalent to assume that we are given a lower bound
vector b 2 ZW of dom(f) such that b  x for all x 2 dom(f). Since the translation
x 7! x  b keeps M-convexity, we can apply the algorithm to the function f(x+ b) in x.
Theorem 5: The greedy algorithm described above computes a minimizer of any M-
convex function f with dom(f)  ZW0 in n steps, where n is the rank of f .
(Proof) Let xi be the x obtained after the ith execution of Step 2 for i = 1; 2;    ; n. Also
denote by wi the element w
 2 W found at the ith execution of Step 2. It suffices to
prove the following local optimality (see [17]):
8u; v 2 W : f(xn   u + v)  f(xn): (5.1)
We show that for any M-convex function f : ZW ! R [ f+1g of rank n  1, the
greedy algorithm obtains x = xn satisfying (5.1), by induction on the rank n of f , where
recall that the effective domain of f lies on the hyperplane x(W ) = n. Note that we fix
W in the following arguments.
For any M-convex function of rank n = 1, (5.1) holds. Hence, let k be an integer with
k  1 and suppose that for any M-convex function of rank n = k the greedy algorithm
obtains x = xn satisfying (5.1), i.e., the greedy algorithm finds a minimizer of any M-
convex function f when x(W ) = k for all x 2 B  dom(f).
Now suppose n = k + 1. Since f remains to be M-convex by the restriction of its
effective domain B to B1 = B \ fx 2 ZW j x((n))  1g, it follows from the induction
hypothesis that
xn 1 is a minimizer of f restricted on B1. (5.2)
Let y 2 dom(f) be a minimizer of f . Notice that if y 2 B1 then xn is indeed a
minimizer of f since f(xn)  f(xn 1) = f(y), where the equality follows from (5.2).
Thus, suppose xn 1((n)) > y((n)). By the exchange axiom of M-convex functions
there exists j 2 N n fig such that y(j) > xn 1(j) and
f(xn 1) + f(y)  f(xn 1   (n) + j) + f(y + (n)   j): (5.3)
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Since y + (n)   j 2 B1, it follows from (5.2) that
f(y + (n)   j)  f(xn 1): (5.4)
Also, since xn 1   (n) + j is a candidate for xn, we get
f(xn 1   (n) + j)  f(xn): (5.5)
It follows from (5.3)–(5.5) that f(y)  f(xn), i.e., xn is a minimizer of f . 2
Remark 3: Consider N as the set of players and identify W with the set Pall of all st-
paths in an extension-parallel network G, and f with ~ in (4.2). Then the greedy algo-
rithm for f becomes Procedure(Best Response). It may also be worth mentioning that the
number n of steps is independent of the size ofW . 2
Remark 4: It follows from results in [22, 24] that as an algorithm for minimizing an M-
convex function f we can skip those is which satisfy (i) 2 fw` j ` = 1;    ; i   1g,
which is also implicitly implied by the above proof of Theorem 5. This corresponds to the
rule: keep the present strategy Pi if it is a best one even if there exist multiple (other) best
strategies. It is a natural restriction of the behavior of the players in the case of congestion
games. 2
Similarly as in [4] for valuated matroids, we have a converse of Theorem 5 and hence
show the equivalence between the greediness and M-convexity as follows.
Theorem 6: Let f : ZW ! R[f+1g be a function having a nonempty bounded effective
domain B  ZW0. For any d 2 RW define fd : ZW ! R [ f+1g by
fd(x) = f(x) + hd; xi (8x 2 ZW ); (5.6)
where hd; xi =Pu2W d(u)x(u). Suppose that f is convex-extensible on RW . Then, f is
an M-convex function if and only if for every d 2 RW , the Greedy Algorithm minimizes
the function fd.
(Proof) Since adding a linear function keeps M-convexity, Theorem 5 implies the only-if
part, and hence we show the if part.
Since f is convex-extensible, denoting by f the convex extension of f , it suffices to
prove that every non-vertical edge vector of the epigraph of f projected on RW belongs
to fu   v j u; v 2 W; u 6= vg, due to Proposition 1.
Let L be an arbitrary non-vertical edge of the epigraph of f and let L^ be the projection
of L on RW . Also let x1; x2 2 B be the end points of L^. Let z 2 B be the point in
(L^ n fx1g) \ B nearest to x1. Then there exists a vector d 2 RW such that x1 is the
unique minimizer of fd and fx 2 B j fd(x)  fd(z)g = fz; x1g. Hence, starting from z,
the Greedy Algorithm for fd must move from z to x1 by the first improving step. By the
definition of the Greedy Algorithm, the direction of the movement from z to x1, which is
a direction vector of L^, belongs to fu   v j u; v 2 W; u 6= vg. 2
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The proof of the if part of Theorem 6 can easily be adapted to that of the following
fundamental fact on generic greedy algorithms. We call a transformation from x 2 ZW
to x  u + v for u; v 2 W a basic local transformation.
Theorem 7: Let f : ZW ! R[f+1g be a convex-extensible function having a nonempty
bounded dom(f). Suppose that there exists an algorithm P such that for every d 2 RW
and every initial solution x0 2 dom(f) Algorithm P finds a finite sequence of solutions
(x0; x1;    ; xk) for some integer k  0 satisfying
(a) fd(x0)  fd(x1)      fd(xk),
(b) each xi for i = 1;    ; k is obtained by a basic local transformation of xi 1.
(c) xk is a minimizer of fd.
Then, f is an M-convex function.
It follows from the present theorem that the validity of algorithms based on repeated
basic local transformations such as those given by [21, 22, 24] implies M-convexity of the
objective functions.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have revealed the M-convexity structure of congestion games on extension-parallel
networks, which explains the fast convergence of the best-response dynamics shown by
Fotakis [8]. We believe that there are phenomena in congestion games in general that can
be viewed from M-convexity or other variants of discrete convexity (cf. [1, 27]). Finding
and investigating such instances are left for future research.
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